

# Causing-to-*have* vs. *having-for* the syntax of double-object *get*

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## 1 Introduction

Early work in transformational grammar generally considered that the following pairs of examples, displaying the so-called dative alternation, were transformationally related, deriving from an identical D-structure.

- (1) a. John got Mary a book. double object  
b. John got a book for Mary. *for*-variant

This tradition was dealt a severe blow by the work of Oehrle (1976) and others following him, who showed that there are important syntactic and semantic differences, including at the level of thematic roles assigned to arguments, between sentences like (1a) and (1b). With few exceptions, work in generative syntax has largely abandoned the idea that (1) shows sentences that are derivationally related.<sup>1</sup> In this paper, I argue for an analysis of a certain subset of English surface strings of type (1a) and (1b) that takes them to be derivationally related.

I will show that there are structural ambiguities both for double object (1a) and *for*-variant strings (1b) that the literature has not systematically recognized. I will argue that, once these ambiguities are carefully considered, it becomes clear that (1a) and (1b) share a reading. (2) gives a preview of the ambiguities I will argue for.

- (2) John got Mary a boyfriend. → John's actions caused Mary to have a boyfriend  
— causative  
John got a boyfriend for Mary. → John "has" someone for Mary to take as a  
boyfriend — *have-for*  
→ John started dating for Mary's sake — benefactive

I will give an analysis of the readings referred to above as *have-for* and causative. I will identify a puzzle raised by relational nouns in certain *get* sentences (and for that matter in certain *have* sentences) which to the best of my knowledge has not been discussed in the literature. Very briefly, sentence (3), in the *have-for* reading I paraphrase, is problematic for existing accounts of *get* because the relational noun *boyfriend* must be both “possessed” by *John* and by *Mary*; however, only with respect to *Mary* does an existential *have* meaning arise, whereby *Mary* stands in the boyfriend relation to some man.

- (3) John got a boyfriend for Mary.  
'John came to stand in some relation to a man whom he thinks ought to be Mary's boyfriend'

I will derive the double-object string in its *have-for* reading from a structure identical to the *have-for* structure of the *for*-variant, up to the choice of pronounced vs. unpronounced elements. I will argue that an analysis in these terms is not only tenable, it also sheds light on certain parallelisms between the *get* alternation and two other phenomena

<sup>1</sup>Larson's (1988) work on dative alternation cases of the *to*-kind is the most notable exception. However, Larson does not address the thematic and semantic differences between a. and b. sentences pointed out by Oehrle (1976); instead, he concentrates on the c-command asymmetries discussed by Barss and Lasnik (1986).

of English, namely the *for* /  $\emptyset$  alternation in infinitival complements of volitional verbs, and the existence of purpose clauses headed by *for*. Moreover, it makes strong cross-linguistic predictions, which I will show to be on the right track.

One critical question for my analysis is how the shared structure gives rise to two different surface strings. I will argue that the structures in (2) that are derivationally related contain a purpose small clause headed by the intentional complementizer *for*. In the spirit of Kayne (2005), I propose that English grammar provides the option of choosing between pronounced *for* and its unpronounced counterpart FOR. When unpronounced FOR is selected, the DP subject of the purpose CP must extract out of the purpose clause and into the matrix clause, yielding the double object construction, rather like the subjects of infinitival clauses selected by volitionals (Postal, 1974) as in (4).

- (4) a. John wants with all his heart for Mary to win.  
 b. John wants Mary with all his heart to win.  
 c. \*John wants with all his heart Mary to win.

The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 I show the existence of the ambiguities mentioned above and delimit the topic of this paper by discussing important confounds. Section 3 contains the analysis; first I fully spell-out my proposal for *have-for* readings of *for*-variants, then I show how a double object string can be derived from an identical structure with unpronounced FOR, and finally I make a proposal for causative readings. In section 4 I show how my proposal addresses the arguments against a derivationally related analysis of the *get* dative alternation. I also discuss specific consequences of my proposal, in particular as regards cross-linguistic predictions.

## 2 Preliminaries

In this paper, I will investigate the syntax of strings of the schematic form in (5a) and (5b), instantiating the *for*-dative alternation that the English verb *get*, among many others, participates in.

- (5) a. *X* got *Y* for *Z*.  
 b. *X* got *Z* *Y*.

I claim that both schemata under (5) are structurally ambiguous. In order to have an adequate account of sentences within the schemata in (5), as well as of the alternation between sentences of the shape (5a) and (5b), it is crucial to distinguish between these different structures.

### 2.1 Ambiguity of the *for*-variant

For many speakers of English, a string like (6), which I will call a *for*-variant *get* sentence, is ambiguous between at least the two readings in (6a) and (6b).<sup>2</sup> Throughout this paper, I will call the a. reading of sentences like (6) their *have-for* reading, and the b. reading their *benefactive* reading, for lack of a better term.

- (6) John got a car for Mary.  
 a. ‘John came to have a car that he intends for Mary to have’ (have-for)  
 b. ‘John came to have a car, and he did so to please Mary’ (benefactive)

The *have-for* reading of (6) gets its name from the grammaticality of sentences like (7), with a very close meaning to the reading (6a) of (6).

- (7) John has a car for Mary.

<sup>2</sup>Some speakers of English find the b. reading in (6b) marginal, and can only get it for sentences like (i).

- (i) John got a car for Mary’s sake.

For speakers of this dialect, the ambiguity in (6) seems not to exist, that is, this dialect lacks a benefactive reading of “for DP” phrases. For the purposes of this paper, the reading of sentences like (6) that is of interest is the a. reading, so the central thesis and analysis presented here carries over to the dialect of speakers that do not get a b. reading for (6).

The ambiguity becomes even more striking when the theme argument is a relational noun such as *boyfriend* in (8) because in each reading a different argument (the goal *Mary* in (8a), the subject *John* in (8b)) is standing in the boyfriend-of relation to some man.

- (8) John got a boyfriend for Mary.
- a. ‘John came to “have” a man whom he thinks ought to become Mary’s boyfriend’ (have-for)
  - b. ‘John started dating a man, and he did so in order to please Mary’ (benefactive)

Notice the scare quotes around *have* in the paraphrase of reading (8a). While I grant that this kind of paraphrase is very odd in the case of (8a), I claim, on the basis of the existence of sentences like (9), with a very close meaning to that of the reading (8a) of (8), that the subject in (8) is a “haver.”

- (9) John has a boyfriend for Mary.

The sense in which *John* in these sentences is a “haver” is perhaps metaphorical. In fact, (10) is a clearer paraphrase of the reading (8a) of (8).

- (10) ‘John came to stand in some relation to a man whom he thinks ought to become Mary’s boyfriend’

Similarly, (11) is a clearer paraphrase of (9).

- (11) ‘John stands in some relation to a man whom he thinks ought to become Mary’s boyfriend’

The relation referred to in the paraphrases is an unspecified relation, perhaps simply acquaintance. For the remainder of this paper, I will give clear paraphrases along the lines of (10) and (11) whenever using *have* results in an awkward paraphrase. However, I take the grammaticality of sentences like (9) to indicate that the subjects of *have-for* sentences are indeed “havers.” I will not address the exact nature of the “having” relation.

Benefactive readings such as (6b) and (8b) are not available for the double object strings that are correlates of sentences (6) and (8). Concretely, sentence (12) has at least the reading paraphrased in (12a), a *have-for* reading identical to the *have-for* reading (8a) of sentence (8); sentence (12) however *lacks* a benefactive reading as in (12b). I use the symbol # to indicate an unavailable reading and leave available readings unmarked.

- (12) John got Mary a boyfriend.
- a. ‘John came to stand in some relation to a man whom he thinks ought to become Mary’s boyfriend’ (have-for)
  - b. #‘John started dating a man, and he did so in order to please Mary’ (benefactive)

The central proposal in this paper concerns the *shared reading* of *for*-variant sentences of the sort in (8) and double object sentences as in (12), that is, the *have-for* readings paraphrased in (8a) and (12a). I will remain silent on the syntax of benefactive *for* phrases.

## 2.2 Ambiguity of the double-object variant

I claim that double-object *get* strings have their own potential structural ambiguity. First, recall that (13) has (at least) a *have-for* reading equivalent to that of its *for*-variant.

- (13) John got Mary a husband.  
 ‘John came to stand in some relation to a man whom he thinks ought to become Mary’s husband’ (have-for)

Now, consider the following entailment facts about the same double-object sentence. I prefix valid entailments with  $\models$  and invalid ones with  $\not\models$ .

- (14) John got Mary a husband.
- a.  $\models$  ‘John knows of a certain man whom he thinks ought to become Mary’s husband’
  - b.  $\not\models$  ‘Mary got married to some man’

Sentence (14) does not entail that Mary has or has ever had a husband. Contrast this fact with the following entailment of sentence (15), very similar to (14) but with a non-agentive subject.

- (15) Mary's intelligence got her a husband.  
⊨ 'Mary got married to some man'

Sentence (15) *does* entail that Mary now has, or at least had at some point in the past, a husband.<sup>3</sup> The following two discourses establish the entailment facts I report: (16) shows that a sentence like (14) can be continued coherently with the implication that Mary never got married, while (17) shows that such a continuation yields an incoherent discourse when applied to sentence (15). I prefix incoherent discourses with the symbol %.<sup>4</sup>

- (16) John had gotten Mary a husband, but she didn't like the guy so she didn't even give him a chance.  
(17) % Mary's intelligence had gotten her a husband, but she didn't like the guy so she didn't even give him a chance.

More abstractly, the question I am asking is whether a double-object sentence validates the entailment schema in (18).

- (18)  $X \text{ got } ZY \quad \models \quad Z \text{ came to have } Y$   
(though  $Z$  may well have ceased to have  $Y$  later, see footnote 3)

Sentence (15) validates (18), sentence (14) does not. I take these facts to be strong evidence that the syntactic structures of sentences (14) and (15) are distinct.

Pylkkänen (2008) points out that what she calls *causative structures* by definition entail their resultant states, that is, causative structures entail the occurrence of the event that is the complement of the CAUSE or  $v$  head. She claims that causative analyses are correct for sentences like (19) and even (21) with double object *give*, given the incoherence of the discourses in (20), respectively (22).

- (19) John broke the vase.  
John CAUSE [ the vase break ]  
(20) %John broke the vase, but luckily the vase didn't break.  
(21) John gave Mary a book.  
John CAUSE [ Mary have a book ]  
(22) %John gave Mary a book, but she's never had a book.

Following Pylkkänen's (2008) diagnostic for causativity, I take (15) to be a causative structure, where "Mary's intelligence" is the causer and "Mary has a husband" the resulting state. It is important to point out that I will apply the terms *causative structure / reading* to any structure / reading that validates the entailment schema in (18), regardless of whether CAUSE or just  $v$  is in the structure.

Turning our attention to double object sentences with agentive subjects, recall that a sentence like (23) (repeated from before) does not entail that Mary ever got married.

- (23) John got Mary a husband.  
a. ⊨ 'John knows of a certain man whom he thinks ought to become Mary's husband'  
b. ≠ 'Mary got married to some man'

A sentence like (23) can of course be coherently continued with the statement that Mary is now married:

- (24) John got Mary a husband and they lived happily ever after as husband and wife.

This is compatible with the following two very distinct possibilities.

1. Only double object *get* sentences with *non-agentive subjects* have a causative structure. That is, a sentence like (23), with an agentive subject, only has a *have-for* reading and never entails that Mary was ever married. However, it is *compatible* with such a situation, and for that reason (24) is coherent.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup>For note that, strictly speaking, Mary needn't have a husband *now*, as it may well have been the case that "Mary's intelligence got her a husband" last year, but she later that year divorced him, being now single. This still contrasts with a sentence like (14), where no actual husband of Mary's is entailed to exist in the present or at any point in the past.

<sup>4</sup>As Richard Kayne (pc) observes, the judgments about discourses like the ones in (16) and (17) become sharper with the perfective *had gotten*, rather than the simple past *got*.

<sup>5</sup>Similarly, "John wrote a book" does not entail that "John wrote *Moby Dick*," but it is *compatible* with John having in fact written *Moby Dick*.

2. *Both* sentences with non-agentive subjects and with agentive subjects have causative readings. In particular, double object *get* sentences with agentive subjects are ambiguous between a *have-for* reading as discussed in the previous section and a causative reading as discussed in this section, with an entailed resulting state.

I claim that 2. is correct: there is an ambiguity in double-object sentences with agentive subjects between *have-for* readings and causative readings. To discard option 1. above, it suffices to show that sentences like (23) can have readings that are incompatible with *have-for* readings. The following discourse shows this to be the case.

- (25) John doesn't know any single men, but ironically enough *he (accidentally) got Mary a husband* by inviting her to the concert where she met the man she would be married to for the rest of her life.

In (25), “[John] (accidentally) got Mary a husband” cannot possibly mean that John knows of some man he would like Mary to marry, as the scenario is incompatible with such a reading. However, the sentence is perfectly acceptable, showing that (23) has a reading that is *not* a *have-for* reading.

In fact, this reading is a causative one. If we control for the *have-for* reading by manipulating the scenario to the effect that John doesn't have any intentions regarding Mary's marital status, or know of any eligible single men, then the entailment that Mary is / was at some point married is valid, as evidenced by the incoherence of the last sentence of (26).

- (26) John doesn't know any single men, nor has he ever met Mary, but ironically enough *he (accidentally) got her a husband* by inviting her to the party where she met Bill. % Sadly though, she didn't really like Bill so they never even dated.

These facts support my claim that sentences like (23), with agentive subjects, are ambiguous between *have-for* readings and causative readings.

The question then arises whether double object *get* sentences with non-agentive subjects like (27), which I have shown has a causative reading, also have *have-for* readings.

- (27) Mary's intelligence got her a husband.

Clearly they do not: (27) cannot mean that Mary's intelligence stands in some relation to a man it thinks ought to be Mary's husband. The reason is that *Mary's intelligence* is by its very nature incapable of standing in the relevant kind of relation to a person, nor can it have intentions of any kind. Accordingly, the *for*-variant of (27) is ungrammatical, as is the simple *have-for* sentence:

- (28) a. \*Mary's intelligence got a boyfriend for her.  
b. \*Mary's intelligence has a boyfriend for her.

This is not to say that non-agentive DPs cannot be subjects of *have* sentences in general. The following is perfectly grammatical.

- (29) Mary's intelligence has many facets.

Non-agentive subjects can be subjects of *have* sentences with suitable complements, such as DPs denoting abstract properties as in (29). Individual-denoting nouns such as *car* or relational nouns like *boyfriend* however are incompatible with non-agentive possessors.

## 2.3 Setting aside further confounds

In this section I delimit more precisely the kind of data relevant to this paper by addressing a number of potential confounds.

### 2.3.1 The definiteness effect and “fetch” readings of *get*

*Have*-sentences with definite objects get a physical possession interpretation, as in the examples below.

- (30) a. John has my keys.  
b. John has every test he ever took.

- c. ?John has the sister you are looking for.

A similar definiteness effect can also be observed for *get*. In the following sentences, *get* means “come to physically possess” or, more naturally, “fetch.”

- (31) a. John got my keys.  
b. John got every book you asked for.  
c. ?John got the sister you were looking for.

In this paper, I will restrict my attention to indefinites, so as to avoid the definiteness effect and “fetch” readings of *get*.

### 2.3.2 A third reading of the *for*-variant?

The labelled constituent status of the string *a boyfriend for Mary* in (32) is more or less unproblematic.<sup>6</sup>

- (32) John got a boyfriend for Mary.

Heavy NP shift (HNPS) can apply to (32), as in (33a), and extraction of both *a boyfriend* and *for Mary* is possible.

- (33) a. John got for Mary a boyfriend he was sure she would like.  
b. For Mary, John got a boyfriend, but for Sue he got a husband.  
c. A boyfriend seems to be what John got for Mary.

Importantly, extraction of the entire string is very marginal:

- (34) ?\*A boyfriend for Mary seems to be what John got.

These facts indicate that the string *a boyfriend for Mary* does not form a DP constituent in (32).

Consider now (35), with a non-relational theme.

- (35) John got a book for Mary.

The same facts about HNPS hold, as well as extraction of *a book* and *for Mary*.

- (36) a. John got for Mary a book he was sure she would like.  
b. For Mary, John got a book, but for Sue he got a cake.  
c. A book seems to be what John got for Mary.

However, unlike the string *a boyfriend for Mary* with a relational noun, the string *a book for Mary* can be extracted as a whole.

- (37) A book for Mary seems to be what John got.

This is puzzling: in the sentences in (36) *a book for Mary* patterns with *a boyfriend for Mary* in that neither is a DP constituent. But in (37) *a book for Mary* seems to behave like a DP constituent.

I take this to mean that strings of the sort ⟨non-relational noun, *for*-phrase⟩ are structurally ambiguous: in sentences like (37), they form a DP constituent, in sentences such as the ones in (36), they do not.

It is unclear how one might disambiguate between the two possible constituent structures for (38), or exactly what the meaning difference is.<sup>7</sup>

- (38) John got a book for Mary.  
a. John got [<sub>DP</sub> a book for Mary ]  
b. John got [ a book ] [ for Mary ]

<sup>6</sup>I thank Chris Collins for comments crucial to the discussion in this section.

<sup>7</sup>One possibility, in the spirit of the analysis to come in the following section, is that the DP constituent *a book for Mary* contains a *for*-relative-small-clause with a head *a book*, being interpreted as ‘a book that is for Mary to have’.

Moreover, it is very mysterious why similar strings with relational nouns, such as *a boyfriend for Mary* do not seem to be structurally ambiguous, at least not in *get* sentences, as shown by the ungrammaticality of (34).<sup>8</sup>

Whatever the answers to these two questions may be, it is clear that strings of the form  $\langle X, \textit{for}\text{-phrase} \rangle$ , both for *X* a relational noun and for *X* a non-relational noun, *can* occur as non-DP-constituents within *get*-sentences, as demonstrated by the possibility of HNPS for both relational and non-relational nouns. I will from now on disregard the existence of the ambiguity raised in this section for non-relational nouns, as this paper is only concerned with non-DP-constituent  $\langle X, \textit{for}\text{-phrase} \rangle$  strings.

## 2.4 Summary


I have shown that *get for*-variant strings are ambiguous between (at least) a *have-for* reading and a benefactive reading:

- (39) John got a boyfriend for Mary.
- a. ‘John came to “have” a man whom he thinks ought to become Mary’s boyfriend’ (have-for)
  - b. ‘John started dating a man, and he did so in order to please Mary’ (benefactive)


Double object *get* strings are ambiguous between *have-for* readings identical to the *have-for* readings of *for*-variants and causative readings:

- (40) John got Mary a boyfriend.
- a. ‘John came to “have” a man whom he thinks ought to become Mary’s boyfriend’ (have-for)
  - b. ‘As a result of John’s actions, Mary is now dating some man’ (causative)

This state of affairs is represented in (41).



In *get* sentences with non-relational themes such as *a book*, a third ambiguity arises for the *for*-variant, wherein the string *a book for Mary* is a constituent, as per (42).



I will provide analyses of the causative and *have-for* readings of *get* sentences, both with relational and non-relational nouns. I will not address the benefactive readings or the DP constituent readings that exist for non-relational nouns. Moreover, I will consider only indefinite themes, avoiding definiteness effects.


<sup>8</sup>It seems that the verb *get* is crucial for the judgment in (34). The same string *a boyfriend for Mary* does seem to behave like a DP constituent in sentences like (i).

- (i) A boyfriend for Mary is what we’re all looking for.

### 3 Analysis

#### 3.1 Background assumptions

I will assume throughout this paper a decompositional analysis of *have* as BE + an incorporated preposition P. This is in line with much recent work after Benveniste (1966), in particular Freeze (1992), Kayne (1993), and Harley (1995). So as to abstract away from issues not directly relevant to this paper, I will essentially import Harley's (1995) analysis of the prepositional phrase part of the structure of a *have* sentence, as exemplified below.



Along with recent work on English *get* (McIntyre, 2005; Schulz, 2007; Shim, 2007), I will further assume that *get* is decomposable into at least two components: an inchoative aspectual modifier and BE. As McIntyre (2005) observes, English *get* is sometimes the spell-out of an inchoatively modified *have*, as in (44a), and sometimes the spell-out of an inchoatively modified *be*, as in (44b).

- (44) a. John got a car.  
          ‘John came to have a car’  
      b. John got sick.  
          ‘John came to be sick’

The grammaticality of both sentences in (44) may seem difficult to reconcile with the assumption about the decomposition of *have* stated above: according to our assumptions, *get* in (44a) ought to decompose into INCH(oative) + BE + P, while in (44b) the right analysis seems to be simply INCH + BE. I will assume with Schulz (2007), within the framework of Distributed Morphology, that *get* is the spell-out of both INCH + BE + P and of INCH + BE.<sup>9</sup>

Finally, an important caveat. In the paraphrases under (44a) and (44b) I use the periphrastic constructions *come to have* and *come to be*. The literature tends to use paraphrases involving these constructions, and sometimes, in the case of (44b) occurrences of *get*, paraphrases with *become* rather than *come to be*. It is important to stress that these are meant merely as paraphrases to help underline the different meanings of the sentences under analysis, they are not an analysis per se.

It would seem at first glance that the following three sentences of English are equivalent (modulo issues of socio-linguistic register and so forth). In particular, all of them seem to involve inchoative aspect and copula BE.

- (45) a. John got sick.  
      b. John came to be sick.  
      c. John became sick.

However, it is clear that *get* and *become* have very different distributions. For example, while *become* can take an indefinite DP as a predicate, *get* cannot:

- (46) a. John became a lawyer.  
      b. \*John got a lawyer.

<sup>9</sup>I am glossing over an interesting issue rarely discussed in the literature cited: what I am representing as BE ought to be existential BE in the case of (44a) and copula BE in the case of (44b). It is a fact that many languages distinguish between different verbs that all (roughly) correspond to English *be* (see for example Radics, 1980), and in particular between copula and existential BE. Thus, under familiar assumptions about universal grammar, it must also be the case that English makes this distinction, in spite of the fact that in English there is only one spell-out for both copula and existential BE, namely the verb *be*. Moreover, BE-languages, whose possessive sentences display both (some correlate of) the verb *be* and a prepositional or case marker, seem to uniformly choose *existential* BE rather than some other variant of BE, in particular copula BE, if they make the distinction between the two. To the best of my knowledge, there are no counterexamples to this claim.



Clearly, the English verb *become* has different properties than the verb *get*, even though they share a common core involving (at least) inchoative aspect and BE. The distributional (and potentially also semantic) differences between the two verbs can be seen to indicate that the decompositional analysis of *get* that is in the literature and that I adopt in this paper is only the tip of the iceberg: further functional heads and morphemes may be involved in spelling-out *get* that are absent from the composition of *become*, or vice-versa for that matter, and that are responsible for the distributional and semantic differences between the two verbs. I will not pursue these important finer-grained distinctions between inchoative versions of BE in this paper. Instead, I make the simplifying assumption that INCH + BE (+ P) spells-out *get*.

### 3.2 The *for*-variant

I now turn to the analysis of the *for*-variant, in its *have-for* reading.

- (47) John got a boyfriend for Mary.  
'John came to stand in some relation to a man whom he thinks ought to become Mary's boyfriend'

Notice that sentence (47) bears a striking similarity to sentences like (48).

- (48) John got a date for Mary to take to the prom.  
'John came to stand in some relation to a person whom he thinks ought to become Mary's date to the prom'

The *for*-clause in (48) is an instance of what the literature has called a *purpose clause* (Faraci, 1974; Chomsky, 1980; Jones, 1991). I propose to explore this similarity in the strongest way, by positing that there is unpronounced clausal structure in sentence (47): specifically, (47) contains a *purpose small clause*. I begin by laying out the analysis of *full* purpose clauses that I will adopt in this paper.<sup>10</sup>

#### 3.2.1 Purpose clauses

**Purpose clauses vs. infinitival relatives** First of all, it is important to distinguish purpose clauses as in (49a) from infinitival relatives as in (49b).<sup>11</sup>

- (49) a. John got a date for Mary to take to the prom.  
b. John knows of a date for Mary to take to the prom.

The string *a date for Mary to take to the prom* does not form a DP constituent in (49a), as evidenced by the possibility of heavy NP shift (HNPS) as in (50).

- (50) John got for Mary to take to the prom a date she will never forget.

The grammaticality of (50) precludes the possibility that the string *a date for Mary to take to the prom* be a relative clause with a head *a date* in sentence (49a): relative clauses do not allow HNPS of the sort possible in (50).

- (51) \*John met whom Mary loves a tall man.

However, the same string in sentence (49b) cannot be HNPSed:

- (52) \*John knows for Mary to take to the prom of a date she will never forget.

Moreover, *a date* in (49b) cannot be replaced by a pronoun or a proper name preserving grammaticality. This is expected if indeed *a date* is the head of a relative clause:

<sup>10</sup>I will not be concerned in this paper with the compositional semantics of purpose (small) clauses beyond a very superficial and informal perspective, and only to the extent that it is directly relevant to the syntactic facts under discussion. The semanticist will notice that the analysis of purpose (small) clauses in this paper is not immediately semantically tenable. In particular, I will keep the internal syntax of purpose clauses as minimalistic as possible, omitting the attitudinal operators and abstractors that a compositional semantics would require. Some of these omissions can be dealt with more or less straightforwardly as soon as one knows what semantic types are required (e.g., a set of worlds or a set of centered worlds is required), while others no doubt pose trickier issues. I must leave them for future research.

<sup>11</sup>For a thorough discussion of the distinction, see especially Faraci (1974, chapter 1) and Jones (1991, chapter 3).

- (53) a. \*John knows of him for Mary to take to the prom.  
 b. \*John knows of Bill for Mary to take to the prom.

This again contrasts with the occurrence of the same string in the *get* sentence (49a), where substitution of a pronoun or a proper name for *a date* does preserve grammaticality, supporting the claim that (49a) does not contain a relative clause.<sup>12</sup>

- (54) a. John got him for Mary to take to the prom.  
 b. John got Bill for Mary to take to the prom.

To sum up, I have shown that the string *a date for Mary to take to the prom* cannot be a relative clause with a head *a date* in a sentence like (55), due to (i) the possibility of HNPS and (ii) the possibility of substituting a pronoun or a proper name for the DP *a date*.

- (55) John got a date for Mary to take to the prom.


I have *not* shown conclusively that the same string is indeed an infinitival relative clause with a head *a date* in a sentence like (56); I have merely provided evidence that suggests it may be a relative clause.

- (56) John knows of a date for Mary to take to the prom.

This paper is concerned with sentences like (55) rather than sentences like (56), so I refer to the literature (especially Faraci, 1974, and Jones, 1991) for a discussion of infinitival relatives.

**A proposal for purpose clauses** I will largely follow Chomsky (1980) and Williams (1980) in my analysis of the *for*-clause in (57), as in (58).<sup>13</sup> I begin with the analysis of non-relational themes like *book* because it will be appreciably simpler than that of relational nouns, for reasons that will become clear later. I will return to relational nouns in section 3.2.3, building on the proposal for non-relational nouns presented here.


- (57) John got a book for Mary to read.




According to Chomsky (1980), PRO A'-raises from the object position to the specifier of C, forming a structure that is somewhat similar to a relative clause, in that non-interrogative *wh*-movement has occurred. The DP *a book* however will *not* be a head to this relative-like structure. Instead, the CP in (58) is selected by the (possessive) preposition P sitting in the matrix clause. P will also select a possessum argument, the theme *a book*, and a possessor argument, the subject *John*. In (59) I present the core thematically relevant portion of the structure.

<sup>12</sup>But notice that the meaning of the two sentences under (54) shifts very noticeably from that of sentence (49a) with the indefinite *a date*. In (54), due to definiteness of the pronoun *him* and of the proper name *Bill*, *get* receives a “fetch” interpretation, as discussed in paragraph 2.3.1. Roughly paraphrasing, sentence (54b) means something like “John went and fetched Bill so that Mary could take him to the prom.” As I stated in paragraph 2.3.1, I will not give an analysis of the “fetch” interpretations of *get* in this paper.


<sup>13</sup>Strictly speaking, Chomsky (1980) (or for that matter the rest of the literature I cite in this regard) does not consider specifically *get* sentences like (55). He discusses sentences with the verb *buy* instead.




Abstracting away from the specifics of the sentence under consideration, I am proposing that P can participate in (at least) two kinds of structural configurations. First, we have the familiar configuration in (60).



However, P can also take an optional CP argument of the appropriate (purpose clause) form, as per (61).



Whenever P selects these *three* arguments, it projects a PP-shell structure as schematized in (61), very much in the spirit of Larson's (1988) VP-shell in (62).



Notice that the PP-shell structure in (61) is not limited to *get* sentences. As I pointed out before, *have* sentences can also take a *for*-phrase; in fact, they can take a *for*-clause, as in (63).

(63) John has a book for Mary to read.


In (63), a PP-shell structure as in (61) is also involved. It is the presence / absence of the aspectual modifier INCH that will determine whether *have* or *get* is spelled-out, as well as other syntactic consequences I will address at the end of section 3.3.1.

### 3.2.2 Purpose *small clauses*


Pursuing the similarity between the sentences under (64), I propose that (64b), where the string *for Mary* appears to be a prepositional phrase, actually contains hidden clausal structure. In section 4.2 I will discuss the advantages of recognizing the existence of hidden clausal structure in (64b), for now, I give the specific analysis.

- (64) a. John got a book for Mary to read.  
 b. John got a book for Mary.

I propose that *for* in (64b) heads a CP somewhat like that of purpose clauses discussed in the previous section, but containing a *possessive small clause* (a PP in our terms, following Harley, 1995) with *Mary* as possessor and PRO as possessum, as follows.<sup>14</sup>



For sentences like (64b), with a non-relational noun, the remaining structure follows more or less straightforwardly from the background assumptions and proposal about purpose clauses presented.



In (66), the matrix PP-shell selects three arguments, PRO as possessor, *a book* as possessum, and the purpose small clause CP *for Mary*. Notice that the possessor PRO is controlled by the agentive subject *John*, merged in the specifier

<sup>14</sup>Faraci (1974, chapter 2, section 1) argues, on the basis of the similarities between the following two sentences, among many others, that what looks like a *for*-prepositional phrase in (ib) in fact contains hidden clausal structure rather like that of (ia).

- (i) a. John built a robot to entertain his guests.  
 b. John built a robot for entertainment.

While the parallelism I am pursuing here is not exactly the one Faraci mentions, my core observations are in the same spirit as his.

of *v*. This is in line with the McIntyre–Schulz analysis of “procure & acquire” readings of *get*.<sup>15</sup> Incorporation of P into BE and of that amalgam into INCH (and perhaps into *v* as well) will spell-out *get*. Unproblematic movement of the agent in [Spec, *v*P] into [Spec, TP] then occurs.


While (66) is an adequate analysis of sentences like (64b), with a non-relational noun, it cannot account for similar sentences with relational nouns. I will now introduce the issue raised by relational nouns and present a refinement of the proposal that can account for *get* sentences involving relational nouns as themes.

### 3.2.3 Back to relational nouns — an important refinement of the proposal


**The puzzle** *Get* sentences with relational nouns for themes pose an interesting puzzle that, to the best of my knowledge, has not been discussed in the literature. Recall the *have-for* reading of (67).

- (67) John got a boyfriend for Mary.  
 ‘John came to stand in some relation to a man whom he thinks ought to become Mary’s boyfriend’

Naively importing the analysis in the previous section, adequate for sentences with non-relational themes, would yield the following structure for the PP-shell portion of the sentence:<sup>16</sup>



Now, possessive P, when its possessum argument is a relational noun, yields what the semantic literature calls an existential-*have* reading (see for example Partee, 1999), that is, the interpretation of [ John P a sister ] is that there is some woman that stands in the sister-relation to John. Irrespective of the compositional semantic analysis of P and relational nouns, it must be the case, within the decompositional analysis adopted here, that an existential-*have* interpretation arises from a structure with a relational noun in the possessum position, as in the following simple *have* sentence.



Taking this natural assumption into account, consider again the representation in (68). There, the relational noun *boyfriend* is in the possessum argument slot of the matrix P, and *John* is in the possessor position. It follows that (68) must correspond to an interpretation whereby John has a boyfriend, that is he is dating some man, and he (somehow) intends Mary to have that man. Such an interpretation is however *unavailable* for sentence (67), and therefore (68) cannot be the right analysis of (67).

<sup>15</sup>That is, this structure will provide the semantics with the basic ingredients necessary for assigning to it the interpretation ‘John was the agent of some event whereby he came to have a book for Mary’.


<sup>16</sup>I simplify the structure slightly in the interest of readability. Strictly speaking, the specifier of the highest PP-shell of the matrix PP in (68) should be PRO, controlled by the subject *John* which will merge higher in the structure, in the specifier of *v*.

The problem posed by relational nouns can be stated as follows. On the one hand, the relational noun *boyfriend* must be interpreted in the possessum (complement) slot of the *embedded* PP, intentionally relating it to *Mary*, so as to capture the aspect of the interpretation of (67) whereby it is *Mary* that is intended to start dating some man, not *John*. On the other hand, the matrix PP(-shell) must have a possessum argument of its own, since it is also an important aspect of the interpretation of (67) that *John* “has” (i.e. he knows of) some man whom he thinks ought to become *Mary’s* boyfriend. Finally, these two possessum arguments, that of the matrix P and that of the embedded P, must somehow be identified as being the same man, for recall that in (67) the man *John* knows of must be the same man who is intended to become *Mary’s* boyfriend.

**The proposal — first ingredient: *as*-phrases** My proposal in this regard contains two main ingredients. First, I will explore the similarity between the sentence under consideration, repeated below as (70a), and (70b), which for some speakers is mildly awkward but not ungrammatical. The two sentences are very close in meaning.


- (70) a. John got a boyfriend for Mary.  
 b. ?John got someone for Mary to have/take as a boyfriend.

I propose to analyze (70b) as (71).




Notice how the analysis (71) of sentence (70b) poses none of the issues raised for sentence (70a), regarding the locus of interpretation of relational nouns. In (71), the indefinite *someone* is the possessum in the matrix PP, being interpreted as the actual individual that *John* “got.” The purpose clause has an object PRO-gap, controlled by *someone*, and the relational noun is base-generated (and remains) inside the purpose clause, where it can be interpreted as an intended boyfriend for *Mary*.

I propose that sentence (70a) be analyzed in the spirit of (71). Restricting our attention to the portion of the structure below and including the matrix PP, this amounts to the following representation.




In (72), ENTITY, a phonetically null nominal phrase I will assume the grammar of English makes available, is in the possessum slot of the matrix PP-shell, rather like *someone* in structure (71). The lower PP-shell structure in (72) deserves a few comments.

The proposal in (72) recognizes yet another possible argument structure for P, as per the schema in (73).



I claim that the PP-shell configuration in (73) is more than just an ingredient of my analysis of *get*, and that it is in fact attested for simple *have* sentences as well, as in (74).



I cannot at this point conclusively prove this claim, but I will point out that, if (74) contains a PP-shell as in (73), then it would be predicted that heavy NP shift could apply to (74) and that a pronoun or proper name could be substituted for *an idiot* in (74), preserving grammaticality.<sup>17</sup> The fact that these predictions are borne out provides preliminary support for the adequateness of (73) even for sentences like (74):<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup>Recall that these were the diagnostics that motivated my analysis of strings of the sort *a date for Mary to take to the prom* and *a boyfriend for Mary* as not forming a DP constituent, and in fact as containing two distinct arguments of the matrix P.

<sup>18</sup>Many speakers find (75b) and (75c) somewhat marginal when uttered out of the blue, though not ungrammatical. With the appropriate contexts however, all speakers accept them. For example:

- (i) a. Anyone would be lucky to *have John as a boyfriend*.
- b. Of course she left you, if *I had you as a boyfriend* I would too.

- (75) a. John has as a boyfriend an idiot who will soon hurt him.  
 b. John has him as a boyfriend.  
 c. John has Bill as a boyfriend.


Returning to *get* sentences, the structure in (72) is a promising alternative to (68), in that it addresses the puzzle raised above about relational nouns. However, it cannot be the complete story. The crucial question that (72) prompts is how does *a boyfriend* come to occur to the left of *for Mary* in the surface string (76)?

(76) John got a boyfriend for Mary.


**The proposal — second ingredient: split DPs** To address the issues with the representation in (72), I will adopt Sportiche’s (2005) analysis of DPs as derived constituents. Sportiche (2005) argues that DPs are derived constituents for two orders of reasons which I will only mention in this paper, referring to Sportiche’s work for a complete discussion.<sup>19</sup>

1. Certain reconstruction paradoxes show instances of an argument that must have been externally merged in a low position, but that cannot reconstruct into that low position for scope. According to Sportiche, the best analysis of such situations is one where only the NP was merged in the low position, while the determiner / quantifier was externally merged in a higher position. The NP later raises to form a derived constituent with its determiner, and “reconstruction” for scope becomes impossible, as is desired, since the quantifier was never in the low position the NP originated from.
2. Predicates subcategorize for NPs, never DPs. In other words, only properties of the NP are ever relevant for selection; no predicate selects for certain determiners but not others. Therefore, NPs, and not DPs, are externally merged in thematic positions. DPs must be derived constituents.

I begin by illustrating the mechanism I adopt with a simple example. Consider Sportiche’s analysis of a sentence as in (77).




Sportiche forms the DP *every cat* in (77) by sideways movement. So as to avoid using sideways movement, I will use a modification of Sportiche’s proposal, to some extent inspired by Hallman (2000, chapter 4). I propose that first the NP raises to the specifier of D, as in (78), without sideways movement.



This is followed by raising of the determiner, forming a DP-shell of sorts.


<sup>19</sup>See also Szabolcsi (2010, section 9.4) for a concise discussion of Sportiche’s proposal and an analysis of French *combien* extraction and agreement puzzles in its spirit.





At this point, both Sportiche (2005) and Hallman (2000) have a DP constituent corresponding to the string *every cat caught*. This is highly undesirable, as DP cannot possibly be the correct label for this constituent. I propose that a manageable amount of remnant movement occur at this point, to address this issue. The VP remnant-moves to the root, into the specifier of what I will noncommittally call XP.<sup>20,21</sup>

(80) ... caught every cat.




**Split DPs in *get* sentences** Recall my (problematic) preliminary proposal for sentences like (81). The main issue with (81) is how does *a boyfriend* come to occur to the left of *for Mary* in the surface string.

(81) John got a boyfriend for Mary.


<sup>20</sup>Remnant movement is a piece of machinery that I will use for independent reasons in later sections of this paper.

<sup>21</sup>This XP may be an extended functional projection of DP that is however distinct from the traditional label DP. The sole requirement is that XP not have the label of the sort of constituent one expects to be replaceable by a pronoun, *wh*-extractable, and so forth. I cannot pursue the issue of its exact nature in this paper.



Following Sportiche (2005), I propose that P selects for NPs, rather than DPs, and that determiners are merged outside of thematic complexes, attracting NPs and forming derived DP constituents. The most important consequence of these assumptions will be that *boyfriend* will be extracted out of the CP and into an existential determiner within the matrix. I proceed to work my way through the proposal step by step, from the bottom up.

First the PP in (82), which will be the purpose-clause-internal PP, is formed. I assume that the NP *boyfriend* does not get case from P; this will be important later on.<sup>22</sup>




Then, an unpronounced definite determiner is merged and the possessor NP *Mary* extracted into its specifier.<sup>23</sup> As discussed above, remnant movement ensues, breaking up the (incorrect) DP constituent *Mary boyfriend*.

<sup>22</sup>In general, it seems that P can never assign case to this kind of complement per se, as evidenced by the necessary occurrence of the presumable case marker *as* whenever (*a*) *boyfriend* remains in situ:

- (i) a. John got someone for Mary to take as a boyfriend.
- b. \*John got someone for Mary to take a boyfriend.


<sup>23</sup>This is plausible given that proper names share many properties with definite NPs. Furthermore, in many languages (e.g. Portuguese, Hungarian, and many dialects of German) proper names are preceded by definite articles.

(83)




The purpose small clause CP is now formed, with merger of the complementizer *for* and extraction of PRO into its specifier. From this point onward I am forced to abbreviate parts of the structure dealt with in previous steps.

(84)




The matrix PP is now formed as discussed above, and BE and INCH are merged. Then, an indefinite determiner  $a$ , which I will label  $D\exists$ , merges right above AspP, yielding the structure in (85). I radically abbreviate the CP for obvious reasons of space; the reader should keep in mind that it corresponds to the CP in (84).




Now, I take  $D\exists$  to be a probe that is looking to satisfy two requirements.  $D\exists$  has a semantic requirement: it needs to find an NP that will provide its quantifier's restriction. It also has a purely formal requirement: it needs to raise to its specifier some phonetically realized NP. I propose that these two requirements, which in the case of the definite article THE in (83) were satisfied by the same element (the NP *Mary*) in one fell swoop, can be satisfied by *two* different NPs if the need arises.

Consider (85) again. The determiner  $D\exists$  probes downward searching to fulfill its semantic and formal requirements, and finds the NP ENTITY. This NP moves to the specifier of  $D\exists$ , but it only succeeds in satisfying  $D\exists$ 's *semantic* requirement, for recall that the NP ENTITY is phonetically null:




The determiner  $D\exists$  has yet to satisfy its formal requirement, namely finding an NP with phonetic content, so it probes further down into the tree, finding the NP *boyfriend*. The NP *Mary* is invisible to this search, as it has already been selected by a determiner, the unpronounced definite THE.

(87)




As before, the determiner is remerged at the root, and there is remnant movement of AspP.

(88)



Recall that the DP *a boyfriend* still lacks case, as  $D\exists$  is not a case assigner. At this point, an (object) agreement head merges and targets the DP, assigning to it accusative case and yielding the correct word order.


(89)



I propose that the case assigner Agr has, alongside accusative case, also *dative case* that it can, but need not, discharge. Movement of the DP *a boyfriend* into the specifier of Agr discharged Agr’s accusative case. Agr then probes down the tree, looking for a caseless DP into which it may discharge dative case. There is no caseless DP in the structure anymore, since *Mary* gets case from the complementizer FOR, and thus Agr does not assign its dative case. This will not make the derivation crash: Agr *can* assign dative case, but it need not, if there is no eligible (i.e., caseless) DP in its c-command domain. This property of Agr will play a crucial role in the analysis of double-object *get* to be spelled out in the next section.

This step is followed by merger of *v* and of the agentive subject *John*. I abbreviate parts of the structure already discussed:

(90) John got a boyfriend for Mary.



The structure in (90) represents (the non-trivial portion of) a sentence like “John got a boyfriend for Mary.” As the structure shows, we have achieved the correct word ordering and labelled constituent structure, as discussed in previous sections. Moreover, (90) addresses the puzzle raised by relational nouns. The NP *boyfriend* originated from within the purpose small clause, where it will reconstruct and be interpreted as *Mary’s* intended boyfriend, rather than *John’s* or anyone else’s. Extraction of the NP *boyfriend* into the matrix is motivated by the probe  $D\exists$ , located in the matrix clause.  $D\exists$  satisfies its semantic requirement by raising ENTITY to its specifier, but since this NP is phonetically null,  $D\exists$  is forced to probe further down into the structure, finding the NP *boyfriend*.

### 3.3 Double object *get*


#### 3.3.1 Deriving *have-for* double object strings

As I pointed out in section 2, the following two sentences share a reading:

- (91) a. John got a boyfriend for Mary.  
 ‘John came to stand in some relation to a man whom he thinks ought to become Mary’s boyfriend’  
*(have-for)*
- b. John got Mary a boyfriend.  
 ‘John came to stand in some relation to a man whom he thinks ought to become Mary’s boyfriend’  
*(have-for)*

Recovering an idea from the early tradition of transformational grammar, I propose that the double object sentence (91b) be analyzed as *derivationally related* to (91a). Concretely, I will take two syntactic derivations  $\Sigma$  and  $\Sigma'$  to be related in this sense just in case they use the same numeration, up to the choice between pronounced elements and their unpronounced counterparts, when they exist. Specifically, I propose that (91b) is derived from a numeration just like that of (91a), except for the fact that unpronounced FOR is present instead of the pronounced *for* of (91a). I will begin by presenting the exact proposal and I will discuss its advantages in section 4.2.


Following the derivation spelled out in the previous section, the CP in (92) is formed, where unpronounced FOR is in the place occupied by pronounced *for* in the analysis of (91a) given above.



I will assume that unpronounced FOR differs from pronounced *for* in that FOR does not assign case to the subject of the embedded small clause. That is, the DP *Mary* in (92) does not have case at this point in the derivation.

Omitting several steps, which follow precisely the course of the derivation given in the previous section, we get the following structure, right after the DP *a boyfriend* raises to the specifier position of the case assigner Agr, getting accusative case. NB: I also gloss over several traces of remnant movement within the CP.


(93)



Recall that Agr has not only accusative case to assign but also dative case, which it can, but need not, discharge. Probing down the tree, Agr finds the DP *Mary*, which has no case since unpronounced *FOR* rather than pronounced *for* has been selected as the complementizer of the purpose clause. The DP *Mary* is accordingly raised to form a second specifier of Agr. *Mary* must raise to this case-assigning position, the only one available in the structure, or the derivation will crash since it would violate the case filter.

It is important to remark that there is no intervening DP between Agr and *Mary* at this point: the DP *a boyfriend* has already been extracted into the specifier of Agr. In the following structure, I omit remnant traces within the DP *Mary*.


(94)



Finalizing the non-trivial parts of the derivation of the double-object string, unproblematic merger of *v* and the subject ensues, yielding (95).

(95) John got Mary a boyfriend.





The structure in (95), which differs minimally from that of its *for*-variant as spelled out in the previous section, yields the desired word order and interpretation.

**Raising to object** Movement of the embedded CP's subject *Mary* into the matrix is, I argue, an instance of raising to object, rather like the raising to object of subjects of infinitivals selected by volitionals as in (96), where the subject of the embedded clause, *Mary*, has clearly raised to some position within the matrix, as evidenced by the (grammatical) intervention of the matrix adverbial modifier *with all his heart* (Postal, 1974).

(96) John wants Mary with all his heart to win the election.

Infinitivals selected by volitional verbs, when the subject of the matrix is disjoint from that of the infinitival, have two variants, one with the overt complementizer *for*, one with an unpronounced complementizer:

- (97) a. John wants for Mary to win the election.  
 b. John wants Mary to win the election.

Notice that, whenever the infinitival subject can be shown to be inside the matrix clause, as in (96), the complementizer *for* cannot occur. Compare (96) with (98).

(98) \*John wants Mary with all his heart for to win the election.

I propose that the alternation in (97) is in essence analogous to the double-object / *for*-variant alternation *get* participates in. In (97b), we have unpronounced FOR, which is incapable of checking the case feature of its embedded subject:

(99) [ FOR Mary to win the election ]

The embedded subject must therefore move out of the infinitival and into a position where it can check this feature, or the derivation will crash. Sentence (100), where *Mary* hasn't moved out of the embedded clause, is out for this reason.

(100) \*John wants with all his heart FOR Mary to win the election.

Conversely, *Mary* can only move out of the infinitival if the infinitival is headed by unpronounced FOR. Pronounced *for* can check its subject's case, and thus preempts its extraction into a case-assigning A-position. This accounts for

the ungrammaticality of (98).

These facts about the alternation within infinitival complements of volitionals pattern very closely together with facts about the *get* dative alternation:

- (101) Pronounced *for*, no extraction:  
a. John wants with all his heart for Mary to win the election.  
b. John got a boyfriend for Mary.
- (102) Pronounced *for*, illicit extraction:  
a. \*John wants Mary with all his heart for to win the election.  
b. \*John got Mary a boyfriend for.
- (103) Unpronounced FOR, extraction:  
a. John wants Mary with all his heart to win the election.  
b. John got Mary a boyfriend.
- (104) Unpronounced FOR, no extraction, case of *Mary* left unchecked:  
a. \*John wants with all his heart Mary to win the election.  
b. \*John got a boyfriend Mary.  
(cannot mean ‘John got a boyfriend for Mary’)

This complete parallelism suggests that the principles governing the interaction between the overt occurrence of *for* and the position of (the subject of) its complement are the same for complements of volitionals and for the *get* dative alternation. I take the parallelism at its face value, and propose that it is a consequence of the fact that English grammar contains both pronounced *for* and unpronounced FOR.

### 3.3.2 Cause-to-have structures

Finally, I turn to double-object sentences with causative readings. As shown in section 2.2, both *get* sentences with agentive subjects and with non-agentive subjects can have what I have dubbed causative readings:

- (105) a. John got Mary a husband.  
‘As a result of John’s actions, Mary is now married to some man’  
b. Mary’s intelligence got her a husband.  
‘Mary’s intelligence caused her (directly or indirectly) to now be married to some man’


Recall that I use the term *causative* purely descriptively, to describe structures that validate the entailment schema in (106).

- (106)  $X \text{ got } Z Y \models Z \text{ came to have } Y$


Bearing in mind the distinction between agentive subjects and non-agentive causers, I propose the following two structures for (105a), respectively (105b), building heavily on analyses by McIntyre (2005) and Schulz (2007).<sup>24</sup> To keep matters simple, I will not use Sportiche’s (2005) split DP hypothesis in my analysis of these causative structures, as their syntax is appreciably simpler and better studied (but see footnote 25 for an immediately compatible proposal).

- (107) John got Mary a husband.

<sup>24</sup>The literature (Harley, 1995, Pylkkänen, 2008, Schulz, 2007) does not always distinguish between agentive subjects and non-agentive causers. For example, Pylkkänen (2008) merges both kinds of subjects in the specifier of CAUSE.



(108) Mary's intelligence got her a husband.



Following Schulz (2007), I take it that, in both structures, the possessor *Mary* gets case from P, as does the DP *a husband*.<sup>25</sup> A *causative* interpretation, as I have been using the term, will come out of both structures. For (107), we get “John was the agent of some event whereby Mary came to have a husband,” and for (108) “Mary’s intelligence caused Mary to have a husband.” In both interpretations, the desired entailment that Mary be married holds.

## 4 Discussion

I claim that the *have-for* readings of double-object and *for*-variant *get* sentences involve derivationally related structures. This is a very strong claim which I cannot strictly speaking prove. However, it has the following benefits vis à vis other analyses.

1. It provides an intuitive explanation for the fact that the meanings of the two constructions (in the relevant reading) are identical;
2. It highlights the semantic and syntactic parallelism between [*for* DP]-phrases and purpose clauses;
3. It highlights the parallelism between the dative alternation and raising to object in the case of *for*-infinitivals selected by volitional verbs;
4. It makes predictions about what kinds of double-object constructions should be found in languages as a function of what kinds of *for*-phrases are found.

Points 1.–3. have been discussed above, and I will address 4. in section 4.3. In the next section, I will discuss specific issues raised by this proposal.

<sup>25</sup>This proposal can be made fully compatible with my analysis of *have-for* readings in Sportiche’s framework. The unpronounced definite determiner merges above AspP and raises the NP *Mary*; then D $\exists$  merges and *husband* raises. This is followed by merger of the agreement head Agr which targets first the (derived) DP *a boyfriend* for raising, assigning to it accusative case, and then the DP *Mary*, assigning to it dative case and yielding the correct word order.

## 4.1 Revisiting the case against derivational relatedness

The early transformational analysis of the dative alternation, by which the proposal in this paper was inspired, was heavily criticized by, most notably, Oehrle (1976). Oehrle, and others after him, argued that there are important meaning differences between the two variants of the dative alternation, and that the existence of these differences shows that an analysis assuming derivational relatedness cannot be right.<sup>26</sup>

### 4.1.1 Oehrle's contrast

Oehrle (1976) identifies a contrast specifically pertaining to the *for*-dative alternation. I adapt his example slightly, substituting *get* for his original *buy* and using an indefinite theme instead of a definite one for reasons reviewed in the beginning of this paper.

- (109) a. Originally, *I got a book for my wife*, but then I decided to keep it.  
b. #Originally, *I got my wife a book*, but then I decided to keep it.

While I agree with Oehrle that (109b) is very odd, I claim that this is not due to a core meaning difference, but an effect of a discourse coherence violation.<sup>27</sup> In (109b), English prosody dictates that *a book* receive stress, since it is at the right edge of a neutrally intoned sentence. This makes the continuation with “but then I decided to keep it” infelicitous. The information structure of this continuation classifies this book as given information (notice that a pronoun occurs) and implies a contrast regarding the recipient of the book. This is incongruous with stress on *a book* in the preceding sentence. Accordingly, (109b) improves appreciably if we make the theme heavier and stress *my wife*:

- (110) ?Originally, I got **my wife** a book about Chomsky, but then I decided to keep it.

The example becomes perfect if we add a temporal modifier at the end of the *get* sentence:

- (111) Originally, I got **my wife** a book about Chomsky for her birthday, but then I decided to keep it.

(110) and (111) are better than (109b) because stress has shifted away from *a book*. As for (109a), it is coherent because *a book* does not receive stress, the DP *my wife* does instead, and this is coherent with the contrast established in the continuation.

This analysis shows that Oehrle's contrast need not be taken to indicate a meaning difference between double-object and *for*-variant.

### 4.1.2 Not all *for*-variants have double object correlates

Another point raised by Oehrle (1976) concerns the fact that sentences like (112a) lack a double object variant.<sup>28</sup>

- (112) a. John ate the soup for his wife.  
b. \*John ate his wife the soup.

First of all, a caveat: this paper is about *get*, and I have so far made no claims about other verbs. While I do intend for my proposal to generalize to at least some of the other *for*-dative alternating verbs, I cannot argue at this point for a completely general account of the alternation. My remarks on this matter are therefore only tentative.

I suggest that the reason why (112b) is ungrammatical as a double object version of (112a) is that (112a) only has a benefactive reading, that is it cannot get the *eat* correlate of a *have-for* reading (i.e., a *eat-for* reading). Recall that my proposal derives double object strings for *have-for* structures, not benefactive ones. Presumably, benefactive *for*-phrases have a very different syntax (internal and/or external) than the one I proposed for *have-for for*-phrases.

To show that (112a) lacks a *have-for* reading, I paraphrase in (113) what that reading would be. (113) is very incongruous.

- (113) John ate the soup and he intended his wife to have the soup.

<sup>26</sup>It is important to note that the vast majority of differences Oehrle identifies concern the *to*-dative alternation, rather than the *for*-dative one.

<sup>27</sup>I owe this idea to Anna Szabolcsi (pc).

<sup>28</sup>This only applies to speakers of dialects that accept (112a) under a benefactive “for the sake of his wife” reading. See footnote 2.

It seems that semantic and pragmatic factors determine whether a verb can participate in a *have-for* structure. That is, if the resulting interpretation is congruent, then a *have-for* reading can be derived.

Interestingly, the same verb *eat* can be used in a similar sentence that does seem to have a *have-for* reading:

- (114) The mother bird is eating some fish for her chick.  
 ‘The mother bird is eating some fish and it intends its chick to have the fish.’

Our knowledge of the feeding practices of birds makes the *have-for* paraphrase under (114) a rather congruous meaning, and therefore a *have-for* reading must be available for (114). Accordingly, the double object version is appreciably better than (112b):

- (115) ?The mother bird is eating her chick some fish.


### 4.1.3 Intensional contexts

Kayne (1975) notices the following contrast (reproduced here for *get*).

- (116) a. I got toys for my great-great-grandchildren.  
 b. #I got my great-great-grandchildren toys.

While (116a) does not entail the present existence of any great-great-grandchildren of mine, (116b) does, making it a very odd sentence under certain assumptions about my age. This datum seems to provide evidence against a derivational-relatedness analysis that syntactically derives (116b) from the same kind of structure that gives rise to (116a).

My proposal in the previous section can account for this contrast within a derivational-relatedness account of the alternation. Recall that I argued that derivations of both sentences in (116) start out with the CP in (117). To facilitate the discussion, I will consider the exact sentences in (116), with non-relational themes, as their syntactic structure can be presented in a considerably simpler way than that of sentences with relational themes. The explanation given in this section also applies to my proposal for relational themes.<sup>29</sup>



Now *for/FOR* creates an intensional context under which the DP *my great-great-grandchildren* is interpreted, shielding it from a specific interpretation that would entail the *actual* existence of my great-great-grandchildren.<sup>30</sup> At the end of the derivation of (116a), this DP remains within the scope of *for*. However, in the derivation of (116b), where unpronounced *FOR* is the complementizer, the DP extracts to the specifier of the matrix agreement head *Agr*, escaping the intensional context and getting a specific interpretation that *does* entail the present, actual existence of my great-great-grandchildren. Notice that the DP *my great-great-grandchildren* cannot reconstruct to its original site, as sentence (116b) lacks a non-specific reading equivalent to that of (116a).

Many cases of extraction from intensional contexts differ from (116b) in that reconstruction is possible, producing ambiguity. Passives are one such case.

- (118) A secretary who can speak five languages is being looked for *t* by every department in this university.  
 a. no reconstruction, specific reading: there is a secretary with these properties and every department is looking for her  
 b. reconstruction back into the intensional domain, non-specific reading: no such secretary need exist

<sup>29</sup>For notice that the relevant argument for this discussion is the goal *my great-great-grandchildren*; the theme *toys* plays no role.

<sup>30</sup>Strictly speaking, there must be a propositional attitude operator sitting right above PP that is responsible for creating this context. In this paper I largely gloss over the finer of points of the compositional semantics of these sentences (see also footnote 10)

Why can reconstruction occur in (118) but not in (116b)? I will adopt an idea by Richard Kayne (pc). Kayne suggests that what looks like reconstruction in the reading (118b) of (118) should be analyzed in very different terms. Instead of the DP *a secretary ...* moving to the subject, Kayne proposes that a larger constituent is being moved, containing a trace of the intensional complementizer *for*. More concretely, *for* extracts to a higher position, and the remnant [ *(for) a secretary ...* ] is then extracted. The desired interpretation is generated because, even though the string *a secretary ...* occurs to the left of the string *for*, it is actually still under the scope of the intensional operator, since a larger constituent containing a trace of the operator, call it XP, has moved.<sup>31</sup>

XP is not a DP, so it cannot be moving to [Spec, TP], but rather to some higher, possibly topical position in the matrix’s C-domain. This means that, in the structures corresponding to the two readings in (118), the string *a secretary ...* differs in two ways: it is a DP in (118a) and XP in (118b), and it sits in [Spec, TP] in (118a) and in a higher position in (118b).

The reason why *my great-great-grandchildren* lacks a non-specific “reconstructed” reading in (116b) is that it is raising to an object agreement position Agr — there is no locus suitable for a larger constituent of the XP kind to move to and get dative case in the structure of (116b). This configuration is analogous to the raising-to-object case below, which accordingly lacks a non-specific “reconstructed” reading:

- (119) I consider a secretary who can speak five languages likely to be looked for *t* by every department in this university.  
 only specific reading: a secretary who speak five languages exists

My analysis, together with Kayne’s (pc) proposal, accounts for the contrast in (116) while maintaining the derivational-relatedness hypothesis.

## 4.2 Advantages over other analyses of *get*

### 4.2.1 The causative analysis of *get*

By and large, the literature that specifically addresses double-object *get* (Harley, 2000; McIntyre, 2005; Schulz, 2007; Shim, 2007) failed to detect the *have-for* (120a) reading of (120).<sup>32</sup>

- (120) John got Mary a boyfriend.  
 a. ‘John came to stand in some relation to a man whom he thinks ought to become Mary’s boyfriend’  
 (*have-for*)  
 b. ‘As a result of John’s actions, Mary now has a boyfriend’ (causative)


All of the works cited in the previous paragraph consider exclusively the causative (120b) reading of (120), providing analyses very similar to the one I adopt for that same reading.

Now, one might suggest that the *have-for* reading could be captured by a slight variation of the causative structure, namely one that includes a modal operator within the resultant state. Specifically, one could propose that the reading (120a) of (120) corresponds to the structure in (121), which is like that of the reading (120b) except for the fact that a possibility operator occurs above AspP.

- (121) John got Mary a boyfriend.

<sup>31</sup> XP is the remnant of the *for*-phrase, which is either a CP or a PP. Since I do not deal with verbs like *look (for)* in this paper, I remain agnostic as to what its exact label is.

<sup>32</sup> At a late stage in my research I came across a notable exception. Andrew McIntyre wrote a (2010) paper on *get* where he recognizes the existence of *have-for* readings. Unfortunately I cannot properly cite that paper, as the draft is no longer available from his webpage, nor can I find my copy of it. Hopefully, it is in press and will be published soon. In any event, I am very confident that in this draft McIntyre effectively imported Pylkkänen’s analysis of English double objects in terms of low applicative heads, specifically to account for what I dub *have-for* readings. As I will argue shortly on the basis of *get* sentences with relational nouns, this is inadequate.



The structure in (121) would get an interpretation along the following lines: As a result of John’s actions, Mary now has the possibility of having a boyfriend. This is somewhat closer to the meaning of the *have-for* reading of (120), in that the interpretation of (121) does *not* entail that Mary now has a boyfriend, only that the possibility of Mary having one has emerged.


However, this interpretation is too weak. Sentence (120), in its *have-for* (120a) reading, does not merely state the existence of a potential boyfriend for Mary, it crucially says that John is in some (not specified) relation to this man, e.g., acquaintance. This aspect of the meaning of (120), in its *have-for* reading, is not captured by the structure in (121). The fact that, in the *have-for* reading of (120), John is a “haver” of some individual whom he thinks ought to be Mary’s boyfriend is a crucial part of its meaning. I conclude that there is no simple variation on the cited literature’s analysis of the causative reading of (120) that can account for the *have-for* reading of the same sentence.

#### 4.2.2 Pylkkänen’s (2008) applicatives

Pylkkänen (2008), although not specifically mentioning *get*, makes the general point that not all double-object strings can be analyzed as causative structures as discussed above. She supports this claim by presenting entailment failures, a diagnostic I used in previous sections to demonstrate the existence of *have-for* readings of *get*. Her analysis, when applied to *get*, is superior to the causative analyses of the literature discussed in the previous section in that it can account for some *have-for* readings of double-object *get*.

At the core of Pylkkänen’s analysis are *low applicatives*. Applicative heads introduce a recipient argument that bears a transfer-of-possession relation to the direct object (theme). For a non-relational theme like *book*, this amounts to the (relevant part of the) structure in (122). I should remark that the syntax of Pylkkänen’s analysis of low applicatives is never fully spelled out, in particular, most labels in (122) are omitted and not at all obvious. I will disregard this issue and attempt to compare her proposal to mine as fairly as possible.

(122) John got Mary a book.



The interpretation of (122) is, informally speaking, “John got a book and that book is intended to be possessed by Mary.” While this may be correct for non-relational themes as in (122), it cannot work for relational themes.

If we substitute *a boyfriend* for *a book* in (122), the interpretation would correspond to “John got a boyfriend and

that boyfriend is intended to be Mary’s boyfriend,” which is inadequate since it entails that John has a boyfriend.<sup>33</sup> Recall that this is precisely the puzzle that motivated my split DP analysis of double object and *for*-variant *get* for relational nouns. I conclude that Pykkänen’s analysis is inadequate since it cannot capture the correct interpretations for relational themes.

Even if we disregard this problem, that is, if we assume that there is some modification of Pykkänen’s analysis that can account for relational themes, there are still important differences between the spirit of her account and that of mine. Most importantly, Pykkänen’s account, since it does not recognize the derivational relation between double objects and *for*-variants, has nothing to say about the relation between the interpretation of *for*-phrases and that of low applicatives. In my analysis, their interpretation is identical because they share the same core structure.

### 4.3 Beyond English

The analysis of the dative alternation (in the specific case of *get*) in this paper takes the two strings in (123), in their *have-for* readings, to be derivationally related.

- (123) a. John got a boyfriend for Mary.  
 b. John got Mary a boyfriend.

One of the advantages of this analysis is that it is possible to extract from it predictions about how languages may vary regarding what double-object strings they have. In particular, the derivation I present for (123b) in its *have-for* reading is quite complex, involving a number of ingredients (e.g., the availability of unpronounced FOR) that may not be available in some languages.

Moreover, recall that I propose very different structures for the *have-for* (124a) and causative (124b) readings of (124).

- (124) John got Mary a boyfriend.  
 a. ‘John came to stand in some relation to a man whom he thinks ought to become Mary’s boyfriend’  
 (*have-for*)  
 b. ‘As a result of John’s actions, Mary now has a boyfriend’ (causative)

This prompts the prediction that languages could exist that have (something that can be identified as a correlate of) double-object strings like (124) with only *one* reading. That is, there could be languages whose double-object strings only instantiate one of the two structures / readings I have proposed for English. Second, my proposal ought to be able to explain *why* one of these readings may be absent from a certain language.

In the following paragraphs, I will show that these predictions are borne out by some languages.<sup>34</sup>

#### 4.3.1 Norwegian and European Portuguese

A clear prediction of my analysis is the following. If a language lacks complementizer *for* then it cannot have double-object sentences with *have-for* readings. This must be the case if I am correct in claiming that *have-for* double-object sentences are derived from *for*-variants where *for*/FOR is a complementizer.

Norwegian does not have a complementizer *for*, but it does have what is presumably a preposition *for*, as in (125). Because Norwegian lacks a counterpart of English *get*, I will consider examples with the verb *kjøpte*, “to buy.” Although I have not discussed how the central thesis and analysis of this paper carries over to other *for*-alternating verbs, examples with *buy* are relevant nonetheless.<sup>35</sup>

- (125) John kjøpte en ektemann for Marie.  
 John bought a husband for Marie  
 “John bought a husband for Marie.”

Now, the exact meaning of (125) is somewhat different from the meaning of its naive English translation. According to my informants, (125) entails that Marie was intending to get married, and is not felicitous in a situation where John

<sup>33</sup>Larson (in press) points out other inadequacies of Pykkänen’s analysis that stem from the fact that her semantics completely divorces the goal argument from the main event structure.

<sup>34</sup>I am very grateful to Terje Lohndal and Andi Witzel for Norwegian and German judgments. I report my own native intuitions regarding European Portuguese sentences.

<sup>35</sup>The sentence in (125) is odd out of the blue, but acceptable in a scenario where people can arrange marriages for other people.



unilaterally gives money to a man so he can marry Marie. Be that as it may, it is important to note that (125) does not entail that Marie ever actually got married.

The following double-object sentence is grammatical in Norwegian, but it only has the interpretation indicated.

- (126) John kjøpte Marie en ektemann.  
John bought Marie a husband  
“As a result of John’s actions, which involved paying someone, Marie now has a husband.”

Clearly, this is what I have been calling a causative reading, for notice that it is entailed that Marie now has a husband. I propose that the unavailability of a *have-for* reading for Norwegian double-object strings is caused by the absence of complementizer *for* in this language. Without complementizer *for*, the structure I have proposed for *have-for* readings cannot be built. The absence of complementizer *for* is presumably also responsible for the fact that the interpretation of (125) does not match exactly its superficially closest English correlate, in that the Norwegian sentence has requirements on Marie’s intentions that are absent from the English sentence.

Norwegian is therefore an example of a language without *have-for* double-object structures, due to the absence of complementizer *for*. Norwegian double-object strings correspond unambiguously to causative structures.

European Portuguese (EP) has complementizer *for*, as per (127).

- (127) O João arranhou um namorado para a Maria levar ao casamento.  
the João got a boyfriend for the Maria take.inf to the wedding  
“João got a boyfriend/date for Mary to take to the wedding.”

Rather like English, it also has what I analyze as *para*-small-clauses, as in (128), whose interpretation matches that of its English correlate exactly.

- (128) O João arranhou um namorado para a Maria.  
the João got a boyfriend for the Maria  
“João got a boyfriend for Mary.”

Although EP lacks double-object strings with full dative DPs, it does have sentences like (129), with a dative clitic, which are superficially similar to English double-object strings.<sup>36</sup> However, the sentence in (129) only has the interpretation indicated.

- (129) O João arranhou-lhe um namorado.  
the João got-her a boyfriend  
“As a result of João’s actions, Mary now has a boyfriend.”

Paralleling the Norwegian data, EP “double-object” strings can only get a causative interpretation. I suggest that this is the case because, even though EP does have clausal *para*, it lacks an unpronounced version of this complementizer. Double-object *have-for* structures, in my analysis, can only be generated if a language contains an *unpronounced* (counterpart of) complementizer *for*.

Norwegian and European Portuguese are not only compatible with my analysis, they show the accuracy of my prediction that there ought to be languages that have double-object strings that are not ambiguous like those of English.

My analyses of the two readings, *have-for* and causative, of English double-object *get* sentences also have the property of differing substantially in their complexity. While my analysis of English *have-for* structures involves unpronounced small-clausal structure, an unpronounced complementizer, and raising out of an embedded CP, my analysis of the causative structure is appreciably simpler. This would lead us to expect that, if a language has double-object strings, then they can at least have a causative reading. That is, there shouldn’t be a language whose double-object strings have a *have-for* reading, but not a causative one. The facts about Norwegian and EP discussed here are compatible with this prediction, and provide preliminary evidence that it is correct.

<sup>36</sup>The *complete* absence of double-object strings with two full DPs in this language suggests that the accusative/dative agreement Agr I postulate has different properties in EP than it does in English. Presumably, EP Agr can only assign dative case to a clitic, never to a DP.

### 4.3.2 Belfast English

Belfast English (BeE) poses an immediate challenge to my proposal, since it has *for to* infinitivals, as discussed by Henry (1995, chapter 4). The crucial piece of data is the following grammatical sentence in BeE.

(130) John wants Mary for to win the election.

In (130), we have what appears to be raising of *Mary* out the infinitival, crossing pronounced *for*. Recall that it was crucial to my analysis that only unpronounced *FOR* fail to assign case to its embedded subject, thereby forcing extraction. If it is possible to extract a subject out of a CP with pronounced *for* into a case assigning position, then I would predict that strings such as (131) would be grammatical. (131) is out both in Standard English and in BeE.


(131) \*John got Mary a boyfriend for.

Based on data from the interaction of *for* and negation in BeE, Henry (1995) argues that BeE *for* is a complementizer that can cliticize onto (the embedded) *to*. In other words, it is not that *for* can fail to assign case to its subject and allow its extraction, rather, *for* can cliticize onto *to*. When this cliticization occurs, *for* can no longer assign case to the embedded subject, since it no longer c-commands it, and the subject is free to be extracted.

Following Alison's analysis of BeE *for*, it becomes clear why (131) is ungrammatical even in BeE: (131) contains a purpose *small clause* where *to* does not occur, and therefore there is nothing *for* can cliticize onto. If *for* cannot cliticize, then it must c-command its subject *Mary*, assigning case to it. The extraction of *Mary* in (131) into the specifier of a second case assigner therefore violates the case filter.

## 4.4 Conclusion and prospects for future research

I have argued in this paper that the early generative grammar tradition that related the two structures of the dative alternation transformationally was essentially correct for English *get*. Although the literature points out several semantic and syntactic differences between double object and *for*-variant, I showed that these differences are not incompatible with derivationally related analyses for the two structures. One of the crucial steps in the argument is recognizing that both *get* double object strings and *for* strings are two-ways structurally ambiguous, and that the two strings share one possible structure:



The second structure, which I dubbed a *have-for* structure, can give rise to two different surface strings, a double object one and a *for*-variant one, as a result of whether pronounced or unpronounced *for* is in the numeration. All remaining syntactic and semantic differences between the two strings in the *have-for* reading can be accounted for in this way.

I argued that the *for*-phrase in *have-for* sentences is in fact a purpose small clause, a CP with *for* in its C position and nothing but a possessive PP in its complement. This purpose small clause contains a PRO gap that is linked to the complement of P, its possessum argument. I proposed that, in the spirit of Larson (1988), the abstract preposition P can have three arguments, a possessor, a possessum, and a purpose clause, in which case a PP-shell structure is present.

I also introduced a puzzle raised by *get* sentences with relational themes that hadn't been discussed in the literature. I addressed the issue by adopting Sportiche's (2005) split DP framework, wherein DPs are derived constituents. This mechanism allowed me to propose a derivation that accounts for the puzzle posed by relational nouns.

Finally, I discussed data from two languages other than English that provide preliminary supporting evidence for my analysis.

There are two very important issues raised by my proposal that I must leave for future work. First, a more thorough look at languages other than English is needed. While the preliminary data I present here are encouraging, facts from other languages appear to provide evidence against my proposal. For example, German has sentences as in (133), which look very much like English double object strings and *for*-variants:

- (133) Johann kriegte Marie ein Buch.  
 Johann got Marie a book
- (134) Johann kriegte ein Buch für Marie.  
 Johann got a book for Marie

The two sentences are synonymous and appear to have *have-for* readings, just like their English counterparts. However, German lacks complementizer *für*. This contradicts the implicational prediction I presented in the previous section.

A careful look into the syntax of German *für*-phrases is needed in order to confirm whether German is in fact a counterexample to my claim. As a piece of mildly encouraging evidence, I point out that my informants tell me that sentences like (133) and (134) are very marginal if we replace a relational noun for *ein Buch*. For example:

- (135) ?\*Johann kriegte Marie einen Mann.  
 Johann got Marie a husband
- (136) ?\*Johann kriegte einen Mann für Marie.  
 Johann got a husband for Marie

Perhaps German *kriegen* is less close to English *get* than it would seem.<sup>37</sup>

The second issue that deserves serious attention concerns the extent to which the proposal in this paper can be extended to other *for*-alternating verbs. In section 4.1.2 I tentatively reinterpreted my definition of a *have-for* reading to the verb *eat*, with somewhat positive results, but a more serious generalization of *have-for* is required if one wants to ask the question which verbs show the *for*-dative alternation and why.

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<sup>37</sup>Notice that my proposal for *have-for* readings of *get* with non-relational nouns is appreciably less complex than my proposal for relational nouns. (I am not referring to my use of Sportiche’s framework or the remnant movement it necessitated: that was a choice for a framework and therefore, even though I do not spell it out for the case of non-relational nouns or causative readings in the interest of clarity, I do assume that its assumptions and consequences hold in those cases as well.) My analysis of non-relational nouns is simpler than that of relational nouns in that relational nouns involve, among other things, merger of an unpronounced ENTITY and raising of the relational noun out of the embedded clause. This would lead us to expect that there might be languages with lexical items that can be main verbs in *have-for* structures with non-relational themes but not with relational themes, due to the unavailability in that language of one of the mechanisms that makes my analysis of relational nouns in English more complex.

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