Ecole Normale Supérieure
Department of Cognitive Studies
29 rue d'Ulm, room PJ005
75005 Paris, France
I am an Assistant Professor at Ecole Normale Supérieure’s Department of Cognitive Studies (DEC), a member of Institut Jean-Nicod, and the principal investigator in the Agence Nationale de Recherche grant Between Language and Reasoning. I got my PhD at New York University’s Department of Linguistics in 2014, where I wrote a dissertation on the relationship between human reasoning, natural language semantics, and the philosophy of language. Between 2014 and 2016, I was a Junior Research Fellow at St Catherine’s College, Oxford, affiliated with the Faculty of Philosophy.
Research in linguistic semantics and the philosophy of language in the past forty years has produced sophisticated mathematical models that represent the meanings of natural language utterances and explain how meanings relate to one another to form entailment patterns. At the same time, research on human reasoning within psychology has discovered a wealth of fallacious inference patterns, establishing that human reasoning is fallible in highly predictable ways. The psychological study of reasoning has been characterized by extensive experimental work analyzed in terms of theories focusing on the processes of reasoning. On the other hand, linguistic semantics has a longstanding tradition of formal rigor and a focus on logical thinking, but it has so far largely ignored fallacies. The two fields overlap significantly, but they have progressed almost completely in parallel, with little interaction. The main aim of my research is to fill that gap by extending linguistic semantics to the study of human reasoning.
My approach has two main components. The first involves recasting the account of human reasoning known as mental model theory in a formally explicit system, incorporating relevant insights from my work on inquisitive semantics. Together with Philipp Koralus I have developed a version of mental-models theory that locates the origin of reasoning failures in a question-asking and answering process. The second component is an interpretation-based theory of (some) reasoning failures that explains these failures in terms of modern theories of implicature. This second theory contrasts with its reasoning-based competitors in that it assumes as a working hypothesis a logically sound reasoning module that operates on interpretations more complex than meets the eye.
From these two rigorously defined theories, different predictions emerge. These predictions allow for a comparison between the two theories, providing a principled way to tease apart the contributions of general-purpose reasoning mechanisms and of interpretive procedures in our failures of reasoning.
I also have an active interest in, and have worked on, the following topics in semantics and philosophy of language
Fridays 9.30am–11.30am, tentatively in Salle Ribot on 29 Ulm, or online. TA sessions TBA (TA sessions are mandatory for students who want to take the course for credit (“validation”).
This course is a fast-paced introduction to natural language semantics and pragmatics. The course is divided into the following three modules, the first of which constitutes the bulk of the course.
Introduction to semantics and pragmatics (80%)
Extensional semantics; compositionality; predication and modification; pronouns and quantification; presupposition; scalar implicature
A brief survey of intensional semantics (10%)
Limitations of extensional approaches; modality; propositional attitudes
Beyond truth conditions (10%)
Dynamic approaches to meaning; questions and commands
An introduction to linguistics, some background in logic, or permission of the instructor.
weekly homework assignments (80%)
participation in discussion in class and TA sessions (20%): if you want to take this course for credit but cannot attend the TA sessions please write to the instructor as soon as possible
with Benjamin Spector
Wednesdays 2pm–4pm, tentatively in the seminar room in Pavillon Jardin on 29 Ulm, or online.
Linguistic pragmatics and the psychology of reasoning are different yet related fields. On the one hand, linguistic pragmatics studies a specific type of reasoning, namely reasoning about speakers’ communicative intentions. On the other hand, the psychology of reasoning investigates how humans derive conclusions from various pieces of information, almost always provided in a linguistic format. Some deviations from normative logic can be explained in terms of linguistic processes that interfere with deductive reasoning. In both domains, the most classical approach is to model human reasoning as a deductive process. However, more recently, several theories have treated both pragmatic inferences and general-purpose reasoning as involving probabilistic inferences in an essential way. This view has led to new perspectives on the core questions and phenomena of both fields.
The goal of this course is to introduce students to probabilistic models of reasoning and pragmatics, and to discuss recent proposals in this domain. We will focus, in particular, on the role of Bayesian reasoning in pragmatics and general-purpose reasoning, as well as the influence of prior probabilities in both domains. The seminar will consist of lectures and discussions of papers and student projects.
This is an advanced seminar targeting graduate students (MA and PhD) in cognitive science, linguistics, philosophy and related fields. We will expect
If you’re not sure you satisfy these prerequisites, please contact the instructors to check.
Students will get credit for this class by developing a personal research project which will result in a 4/5-page paper. The project might be an original research project, a review of the literature, an implementation of a model discussed in the literature, etc. Students registered for credit will be expected to do the regular readings for the course and come prepared for in-class discussion.